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Based  on  neurobiological  and  evolutionary  arguments,  the  generalized  unsafety  theory  of  stress  (GUTS)
hypothesizes  that  the stress  response  is  a default  response,  and that  chronic  stress  responses  are  caused
by generalized  unsafety  (GU), independent  of stressors  or their  cognitive  representation.  Three  highly
prevalent  conditions  are  particularly  vulnerable  to becoming  ‘compromised’  in  terms  of  GU,  and  carry
considerable  health  risks:
(1)  ‘Compromised  bodies’:  in conditions  with  reduced  bodily  capacity,  namely  obesity,  low  aerobic  fitness
and  older  age,  GU  is  preserved  due  to its  evolutionary  survival  value;
(2) ‘Compromised  social  network’:  in loneliness  the  primary  source  of  safety  is lacking,  i.e. being part  of a
cohesive  social  network;
(3)  ‘Compromised  contexts’:  in  case  of specific  stressors  (e.g.  work  stressors),  daily  contexts  that  are  neutral
besity
oneliness
by  themselves  (e.g.  office  building,  email  at home)  may  become  unsafe  by  previously  being  paired  with
stressors,  via  context  conditioning.
Thus, GUTS  critically  revises  and  expands  stress  theory,  by  focusing  on  safety  instead  of  threat,  and  by
including  risk  factors  that  have  hitherto  not  been  attributed  to  stress.© 2016  Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.
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. The problem of chronic stress responses and its new
ypothesized solution
Psychosocial stress, including chronic anxiety, is a major
isk factor for somatic disease, including cardiovascular disease
Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002; Krantz and McCeney, 2002; Kubzansky
nd Kawachi, 2000; Roest et al., 2010; Rosengren et al., 2004; Searle
nd Bennett, 2001; Tully et al., 2013). The stressors for which this
s best documented are work stress (Bosma et al., 1998; Matthews
nd Gump, 2002; Chandola et al., 2008), marital stress (Matthews
nd Gump, 2002; Orth-Gomer et al., 2000) and bereavement (Lee
t al., 2003; Vitaliano et al., 2002). Still, the underlying psychophys-
ological mechanisms remain poorly specified. It is widely agreed
hat chronic physiological stress responses are the crucial causal fac-
or leading to disease, but despite more than half a century of
esearch, the precise causes of these chronic responses have not
et been sufficiently revealed. Conventional stress theories still
mbrace the reactivity hypothesis that holds that multiple intense
esponses during stressors are important. These theories neglect
 crucial aspect: the duration of the exposure that often out-
asts the stressful events themselves. We  previously hypothesized
hat actually occurring stressors are far less important than what
appens in people’s thoughts, that is, their cognitive representa-
ions of stressors, termed ‘perseverative cognition’ (PC; Brosschot
t al., 2006; see also Fig. 2a). PC may  even be largely unconscious
Brosschot, 2010; Brosschot et al., 2010) but still leads to prolonged
hysiological stress responses (ibidem). PC is not only a core ele-
ent chronic stress, but also in chronic anxiety, and the latter
an be easily conceptualized as a chronic psychobiological stress
esponse in the absence of realistic stressors (e.g. Hoehn-Saric et al.,
004; Licht et al., 2009; Thayer et al., 1996). Despite growing evi-
ence that PC causes prolonged physiological responses, especially
or cardiovascular and endocrine (i.e. cortisol) activity (Brosschot
t al., 2006; Ottaviani et al., 2015; Verkuil et al., 2010; Zoccola and
ickerson, 2012), it is still far from explaining most of, let alone
ll of, the often extremely protracted stress responses associated
ith chronic stressors such as work stress, marital stress or loneli-
ess, chronic anxiety, and their psychophysiological concomitants
uch as continuously increased rest levels of blood pressure, cor-
isol or low heart rate variability (HRV; Robles and Kiecolt-Glaser,
003; Thayer et al., 2010). What causes these, often truly chronic,
esponses, which over time will result in biological dysregulation
Brosschot et al., 2006), or ‘allostatic load’ (McEwen and Seeman,
999)? It seems unlikely that people think incessantly about their
tressors, either consciously or unconsciously (this problem is illus-
rated in Fig. 1a–c). But if PC cannot sufficiently explain truly
hronic responses what else explains them? In this article, we take
 radically different viewpoint by posing that not PC but the auto-
atic (i.e. largely unconscious) ‘generalized perception of unsafety’ is
he crucial explanatory mechanism. How might this new idea solve
he problem of what causes chronic physiological responses that,
n the long run, lead to disease? Using a new theoretical approach,
alled the “Generalized Unsafety Theory of Stress” (GUTS), we  pro-
ose that the solution lies in the fact that the way in which the
roblem is phrased is wrong.Please cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
. The generalized unsafety theory of stress (GUTS)
Current neurobiological evidence (e.g. Ahern et al., 2001; Amat
t al., 2005; Motzkin et al., 2015; Grupe and Nitschke, 2013; see . . . .  . .  .  .  . . .  . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  . .  00
below) and evolutionary reasoning (e.g. Nesse, 2005; Trimmer et al.,
2013 see below) imply that the stress response is a default response
of the organism, and that it is the response the organism automat-
ically falls back upon when no other information is available. So,
the problem should not be formulated as: “what causes chronic
stress responses?” but as “what mechanism allows the default stress
response to be turned off?—and when does this ‘switch off’ mode
fail to work?” To answer this last question is the chief goal of this
article. We hypothesize that the mechanism that explains most
chronic stress responses in daily life is the generalized perception
of unsafety (GU), that is largely automatic (and as a result mainly
unconscious). The argument in a nutshell: GU causes the default
stress response to remain activated, whenever our phylogenetically
ancient mind-body organism fails to perceive safety in a wide range
of situations in modern society that are not intrinsically dangerous.
This new explanation forms a radical shift from current stress the-
ory – including our own  PC hypothesis – that focuses on stressors
and PC. It comprises a completely new theory called, as mentioned,
the “Generalized Unsafety Theory of Stress” (GUTS). A key prin-
ciple of GUTS is that not being able to switch off, or inhibit the
default stress response is not dependent on actual stressors or PC:
perceived GU is sufficient, GU is the crucial element here. Due to
GU, chronic stress responses occur in an objectively safe world, with
no threatening information. The GUTS has a far greater explanatory
ability than other current stress theories. Most esentially, as we will
explicate below, it predicts how prolonged and even chronic stress
responses occur when no actual stressors (threats) are present at all,
or even cognitive representations of stressors, because of the con-
tinuous failure to perceive safety. Therefore, it can explain a much
higher number of hypothetical situations in which stress responses
may occur. For large groups of people, this means all situations,
e.g. in people with a so called ‘compromised’ body or social net-
work, as we shall explain below. GUTS is thus likely to be far better
at explaining prolonged or chronic stress-related physiological activ-
ity. With increasing chronic stress as well as booming health care
costs in our society it is very timely to test this new theory. We  will
further detail the hypotheses of GUTS below.
Before doing so, we  would like to point out that these
hypotheses pertain not only to stress but also to anxiety and its
(neuro)physiological concomitants. As mentioned above, in terms
of stress theory anxiety can be viewed as a stress response with-
out actual stressor, and neuroscientists commonly treat stress and
anxiety as the same subject because of their shared neurobiology.
We have discussed the relevance of GUTS for anxiety in more detail
elsewhere (Brosschot et al., 2016).
3. Feeling unsafe in a safe world: the neurobiological and
evolution-theoretical basis of GUTS
It might feel somewhat counterintuitive that an intensely pow-
erful and primary survival mechanism such as the chronic stress
response is sparked off by the mere absence of something like per-
ceived safety,  instead of the presence of something profound like a
threatening situation, or disturbing thoughts thereof. Yet, precisely
because the stress response is a primary survival mechanism, it
should be the response to automatically and immediately fall backents that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress
 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.019
upon when the only information that could stop it, i.e. proof of safety
is not available. Organisms have survived in evolution not by wait-
ing for more evidence of threat but instead by erring on the side
of caution (e.g. Nesse, 2005; Trimmer et al., 2013), or, popularly
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Stressor Stressor Stressor
Physiological
response
a Co nvenonal stress theo ry: stresso rs
Time →
(e.g. 1 day)
Stressor Stressor Stressor
PC PC PC
b Persev erave cognion (PC) theory: stresso rs plus PC
Stresso r Stresso r Stresso r
PC PC
Safe ?
PC
c Idem, but: no stress response in the remaining me?
Stresso r Stresso r Stresso r
PC PC
Unsafe
d Generalized unsafety theo ry of stress (GUTS): Stress ors, PC ,
plus unsafe stressor-condione d con texts
Safe
PC
Unsafe
Safe
e Generalized uns afety theo ry of stress (GU TS): Stress ors, PC ,
plus unsafe stressor-condione d con texts
Unsafe
f Chronic un safety (e.g. ‘comp romise d bodies’ & lon elin ess )
Fig. 1. Hypothetical stress responses (e.g. increased heart activity) in a given time period (e.g. one day): according to current stress theories (a) i.e. to actual stressors;
according to perseverative cognition theory (b and c) i.e. to stressors and their (unconscious) cognitive representation (perseverative cognition; PC); according to Generalized
Unsafety Theory of Stress (GUTS) in the case of compromised contexts (d and e) i.e. to stressors, (unconscious) PC plus to stressor-free but stressor-conditioned contexts (e.g.
‘chronic’  stressors); and also according to GUTS, in case of compromised social network (e.g. loneliness) or compromised bodies (e.g. obese, old, aerobic unfit) (f) i.e. to all
contexts/chronic. NB. This are schematic diagrams: in real life, the physiological response magnitude will vary across time as a function of the extent of perceived unsafety.
Adapted from Brosschot et al., 2016.
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iormulated, to be ‘better safe than sorry’. For this reason the stress
esponse is default, it is ‘always there’, on the verge of being acti-
ated, only being inhibited when safety is clearly perceived.
This evolutionary line of reasoning is supported by several – new
ut also old – neurobiological insights, especially concerning the
ole of the prefrontal cortex in regulating subcortical sympathoex-Please cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
itatory default activity, and the ease and speed of the default stress
esponse, and conversely, the low cost nature of its (long-term)
nhibition.3.1. Prefrontal inhibition of subcortical excitation
The stress response is mediated by subcortical areas in the brain,
i.e. the so called limbic structures, including the amygdala, and it
is normally under continuous (‘tonic’) inhibition by the prefrontal
cortex (PFC; Ahern et al., 2001), more specifically by the ventrome-ents that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress
 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.019
dial PFC (vmPFC; Motzkin et al., 2015). When safety is in doubt,
subcortical inhibition by the vmPFC is decreased and amygdala
activity is enhanced (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). This happens even
long after a stressor has stopped, when safety is still in question
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Stressor
Generalized
Unsa fety
Prolonged or  
Chronic Stress 
Response
Disease
Stressor-related
Context
All Contexts
UnsafetyPC
Short Response
Longer Response
Envi ronme nt Percepon Physiology Outcome
Stressor
Prolonged or  
Chronic Stress 
Response
Disease
PC
Short Response
Fig. 2. Generalized Unsafety (GU) explains far more physiological stress responses than stressors and (unconscious) PC, leading to somatic disease.
Adapted from Brosschot et al., 2016.
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rvan Marle et al., 2010), and chronically – even when no threats
re present – for example in humans and animals with chronic
nxiety (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). Conversely, during a stressor
hat turns out to be safe (controllable) amygdala activity is again
nhibited by the PFC (Motzkin et al., 2015). The notion that removal
f prefrontal inhibition “permits” rather than “causes” an increase
n physiological activity (disinhibition) is consistent with the old
ut unduly overlooked ‘Hughlings Jackson principle of hierarchi-
al integration through inhibition’ (Hughlings Jackson, 1884; see
lso Thayer et al., 2012). According to this principle, phylogeneti-
ally old responses (such as the stress response), are in Jackson’s
ords “not ‘goaded into activity,’ but are ‘let go”’. It is supported by
tudies showing that the amygdala has the lowest spontaneous fir-
ng rate (indicating tonic inhibition; Quirk and Gehlert, 2003), and
hat experimental PFC inactivation in human volunteers by inter-
al carotid artery injections of sodium amobarbitol increases heart
ate HR and lowers HRV, – without any stressor! – which is less
o in older individuals (Thayer et al., 2009), which is in fact consis-
ent with GUTS (see Section 3.3 below). Furthermore, it has been
hown that patients with vmPFC damage show diffuse resting-state
mygdala functional connectivity to non-prefrontal areas (Motzkin
t al., 2015), and importantly we have recently shown that rest-
ng state amygdala-mPFC connectivity is positively correlated with
esting HRV (Sakaki et al., 2016). In addition, we have shown that
PFC-pons connectivity during a subjective emotional experience
ask was negatively correlated with depressive symptoms and pos-
tively correlated with HRV during the emotion task (Smith et al.,
015). Several studies suggest that in both task-related and resting
tate studies as well as in trait anxiety the top-down regulation by
he PFC of the amygdala is diminished (Kim and Whalen, 2009; Kim
t al., 2011a, 2011b; Davidson and McEwen, 2012; Urry et al., 2006).
im et al. (2011a) for example demonstrated negatively correlated
mygdala-ventral mPFC functional connectivity at rest in high anx-
ous individuals, in contrast to positively correlated activity in low
nxious subjects. This role for the vmPFC was also shown in animalPlease cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
tudies vmPFC (e.g. Maier, 2015). Thus, the stress response is not
riggered, but disinhibited. This has been overlooked by modern
tress science. The presence of safety inhibits stress-induced neu-
al activity, in contrast to the prevalent view that such activity isinduced by a lack of control (Amat et al., 2005). Importantly, this
inhibition appears to be at least partially dependent upon the pre-
frontal cortex inhibiting subcortical sympathoexcitatory circuits
(Thayer, 2007).
3.2. Economic inhibition, quick and wasteful disinhibition
It hardly takes any time to ‘err on the side of caution’ and decide
that the world is not safe, while it takes time and effort to decide
that it is. This for example is shown by the finding that a positive
(‘safe’) interpretation of ambiguous facial expressions of surprise
takes longer and takes more effort (and higher vmPFC activation)
than a negative interpretation (‘unsafe’; Kim et al., 2003). One
might counter-argue that to continuously inhibit the default stress
response during times of safety would be too costly. However,
from an evolutionary perspective one would expect that individ-
ual organisms spending minimum energy on a survival mechanism
that preferably operates continuously will have had the highest
chance to pass on their genes. It appears that inhibitory neural
action indeed requires considerably less energy than excitatory
action, there are far less inhibitory neurons than excitatory neu-
rons in the brain, with far more general connections across the
central nervous system (Waldvogel et al., 2000). This suggests that
the inhibitory neurons act in a non-costly and highly generalized
manner with immediate and profound effects. Thus, the inhibition
of the default stress response when safety is perceived, may take
time to be established, but it is not costly to prolong it. On the
contrary, its disinhibition takes little time, but is costly, and when
prolonged it may  lead to biological dysregulation and disease. Being
default and at the same time costly underscores that being default
is not the same as being the ‘desired state’. It is simply the state to
return to when no information (i.e. about safety) is available.
3.3. Default stress response /= default mode networkents that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress
 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.019
If the brain is ‘at rest’, a term neuroscientists use meaning that
it is not involved in a task assigned by the experimenter, a neu-
ronal network is activated containing many brain regions (Raichle
et al., 2001) that actively inhibit subcortical responses including
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tress responses. In GUTS terminology the brain is then ‘perceiving
afety’. Confusingly, this resting state network goes by the name
efault mode network (DMN; Raichle et al., 2001). Importantly, the
se of default here is correct to the extent that it means ‘default
ith respect to experimental tasks’. However, it is not default in
he sense we described above: the response that the organism
utomatically falls back upon when no other information is avail-
ble, that is, a state of uncertainty about safety, for which, we
rgue, organisms are naturally intolerant: organisms are intoler-
nt for uncertainty by default. Thus, during activation of the brain’s
default mode network’, the default stress response is typically
nhibited.
. Predicting stressors and recognizing safety: a role for the
agus
The brain is often viewed as a “prediction machine”, serving
ajor life goals. It proactively activates possible scenarios (Bar
t al., 2007), continuously calculating safety. As long as the out-
ome is ‘safe’, the default stress response is inhibited by the vmPFC.
f the prediction machine works optimally, it will detect safety
ues except during the clear presence of a stressor. When stressors
annot clearly be predicted, the safety of the surroundings is not
uaranteed, and the stress response remains disinhibited, even in
he (temporal) absence of stressors. Safety signals have been shown
o be learned cues that predict the stress free periods (Christianson
t al., 2008).
The importance of recognizing safety became obvious in the
ow classic studies by Weiss and co-workers (see Weiss, 1970)
hich showed that unpredictable stressful stimuli (e.g. electric
hocks, noise) caused a host of deleterious physiological outcomes.
he predictability paradigm became an important model for stress,
epression and anxiety (Davies and Craske, 2015; Grillon et al.,
009; Mineka and Kihlstrom, 1978; Woody and Rachman, 1994).
he stress reducing effect of predictability was generally explained
n terms of recognizing safe periods between the stressful stimuli.
n other words, the animal or human subject knew that dur-
ng a given period no harm would happen. Unpredictability of
dverse stimuli undermined this expectation: the adverse stimula-
ion could now occur anytime, and the time between stressors had
ecome unsafe. However somehow, during the last half a century,
tress researchers (including our colleagues and ourselves) have
 again – been missing the most important point here: the cru-
ial – because prolonged – stress responses did not occur during the
npredictable stressors, but during the periods in between stressors!
gain, it is to the objectively neutral (but uncertain) periods that
esponses are initiated and maintained – due to not recognizing
afety.
Importantly, more recent studies have shown that even if safety
ues are available, they are often not recognized (e.g. Maren et al.,
013; Melzig et al., 2009; Pappens et al., 2014; Ruiz-Padial et al.,
003; Wendt et al., 2015). Moreover, not recognizing safety is not
estricted to people suffering from stressors or anxiety (Pappens
t al., 2014; Ruiz-Padial et al., 2003; Wendt et al., 2015). As we will
iscuss below, there are individual and state-dependent influences
n not recognizing safety that appear to be strongly associated with
he activity level of the autonomic nervous system, especially the
arasympathetic branch, served mainly by the nervus vagus andPlease cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
herefore often called vagal activity. High vagal activity is reflected
n high heart rate variability (HRV). In fact, merely having a low rest-
ng heart rate variability (HRV) seems sufficient for not recognizing
afety, and thus GU. PRESS
havioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5
4.1. Default stress responses to ‘safe’ stimuli and low heart rate
variability
HRV has been shown to be an easily accessible measure of vagus
nerve activity. For example, it has been shown in a rodent model
that high frequency HRV correlates 0.88 with vagus nerve activ-
ity (Kuo et al., 2005). The vagus has been shown to be important
in the regulation of a number of physiological systems besides the
cardiovascular system including inflammation, glucose, and lipids.
Thus low HRV has been associated both cross-sectionally and longi-
tudinally with inflammation, glucose levels, and cholesterol levels
(Thayer and Fischer, 2009, 2013; Jarczok et al., 2014, 2013). Further-
more, HRV has been shown to be more closely related to self-rated
health that a broad panel of biomarkers (Jarczok et al., 2015). Impor-
tantly, an age- and gender-adjusted clinical cut-point for HRV as
indexed by the root mean squared successive difference (RMSSD)
has been suggested such that persons with daytime RMSSD below
30 ± 5 ms  are at greater risk for a number disorders (Jarczok et al.,
2015).
HRV is important for GUTS because low HRV, as a measure of
parasympathetic (vagal) withdrawal, i.e. the critical, autonomic
stress response, is strongly linked to PFC-inhibition of subcortical
areas (e.g. Smith et al., 2015). For optimal survival, the disinhibition
of the response to threat must be as immediate and fast as possible.
This is why it is a default response, that is ‘always ready’, only to be
inhibited when safety is clear, as argued above. This instantaneous
disinhibition requires a system that is extremely fast and located
all over the body, since the whole body is involved in the stress
response. The vagus is such as system (Berthoud and Neuhuber,
2000). Therefore, in GUTS terminology, low resting HRV (‘vagal
withdrawal’) is an index of the chronically disinhibited default
stress response.
Showing physiological stress responses to safe (neutral) stimuli
has been found to be associated with low HRV (Pappens et al., 2014;
Ruiz-Padial et al., 2003; Wendt et al., 2015). Specifically, low HRV
has been shown to predict psychophysiological stress responses
to safe (neutral) stimuli, and thus implying GU, using a variety
of experimental paradigms. For example, low HRV predicts a high
startle response to neutral stimuli in men (Ruiz-Padial et al., 2003)
and diminished safety learning, i.e. fear responses in fear condi-
tioning to CS- as well as CS+, or slow extinction (Pappens et al.,
2014; Wendt et al., 2015) and, in contrast, amplified contextual
fear conditioning (Melzig et al., 2009), that is, generalizing stress
responses from the fearful CS+ to a wider context (environmen-
tal/social; Maren et al., 2013), i.e. the context as CS+. Thus: GU is
linked to low HRV, even when stressors are absent.
5. Deficient safety learning during development
At the start of our life, when we  leave the safe uterine world,
we all start with the default stress response, but soon we learn
to predict the safety signals around us: the conditions under which
hunger and thirst are satisfied, when affiliation needs are being met,
reflected in an increasing HRV (Porges, 2007). During our life our
brains learn the increasing complexity of the contingencies of safety
and their generalizability toward new people, situations and envi-
ronments, and thus when and where to inhibit the default stress
response.
It is a truism to say that threats (stressors) are unavoidable in life,
but in reality, their actual presence is very much restricted in time
and place, even in our ancestral surroundings. During maturationents that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress
 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.019
young humans as well as young animals acquire an increasingly
complex fear learning capacity (see Glenn et al., 2012). Impor-
tantly, the direction of learning is not from no fear toward anxiety
but from general anxiety toward specific fear. In other words, they
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tart with a general default stress response, after which the devel-
ping animal or human gradually learns about the predictability
nd controllability of threats in life. It should be noted here that
espite conceptual, behavioral and neurobiological (Christianson
t al., 2008) differences between predictability and controllabil-
ty, their net results in terms of perceived safety and physiological
esponses can be assumed to be comparable. There is increasing
vidence that experiences of control even ‘immunize’ against suc-
essive uncontrollable situations (contexts) and generalizes across
imilar contexts (Maier, 2015), and adolescence may  be the sensi-
ive period for this type of learning. An experiment by Kubala et al.
2012) suggested that for adolescent rats but not adult rats, expe-
iencing a controllable stressor (e.g. escapable shock) is not only
undamental to ‘immunize’ the rat for its entire lifespan, but that
his is also better than not experiencing a controllable stressor at
ll. Hence, it is important that organisms experience stressors and
lso develop some experience with control of stressors. If an organ-
sm never experiences a stressor it will never learn the capacity to
ontrol stressors, and thus safety.
This contingency learning about safety can be successful in dif-
erent degrees and fail in many ways. Some of these ‘failures’ seem
o determine relatively stable, change-resistant GU, such as inher-
ted psychological vulnerability (e.g. traits such as neuroticism),
hronic prenatal maternal stress and chronic early life stress. In
erms of GUTS, in these conditions a deficient inhibition of the
efault stress response is brought about on different developmen-
al levels: it is either passed via genes (suggesting limited safety
n one’s specific ancestral past), or via the prenatal or perinatal
eurobiological milieu (suggesting limited safety in these periods)
r safety contingency learning is prevented due to a lack of clear
afety cues in postnatal early life (e.g. in case of abuse or emotional
eglect). In line with this, chronic early life stress – as opposed to
he controllable acute stressors mentioned above – has been found
o be associated with low HRV (Dale et al., 2009; Heitkemper et al.,
011). Moreover, a number of studies have documented deficits
n both anatomy (e.g. gray matter volume) and connectivity in the
refrontal-limbic network due to prenatal and early life stress in
oth animals and humans (see Tost et al., 2015; van Harmelen et al.,
010). The usual explanation for these findings is often formulated
n terms of neural damage or retardation of normal neural growth.
his might be the case for very severe (traumatic) stressors. How-
ver, according to GUTS it is more likely that chronic early life stress
revents the brain from learning the complexities of safety contin-
encies, and thus from growing the neural structures subserving
his knowledge. Likewise the enhanced stress vulnerability in later
ife associated with chronic early life stress (see Tost et al., 2015),
ight not or not only be the result of ‘damage’ or ‘reprogramming’
ut for a large extent of a deficient inhibition of the default stress
esponse, due to not learning sufficient safety cues.
Other safety learning failures theoretically more amenable to
hange can occur and produces GU later in life. In our view there
re three distinct major domains that are particularly vulnerable to
he development or maintenance of GU later in life: our body, that
hould be sufficiently capable to deal adequately with the threats
f our ancestral habitat; our social network, which should provide
he primary safety signal for social animals such as humans; our
ontext, which in modern society is, despite occasional threats,
verwhelmingly safe compared to – again – our ancestral habitat.
e call these domains compromised, when they fail to contribute
o perceptions of safety. We  chose these three domains not only
ecause their ‘safety failures’ are potentially changeable, but also
ecause when ‘compromised’ they carry highly prevalent major riskPlease cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
actors for somatic disease in modern society: in our body, e.g. obe-
ity, old age or aerobic unfitness; in our social network, e.g. loneliness,
nd our daily contexts may  become unsafe through contextual fear-
onditioning. This basically implies that some of the biggest – and PRESS
havioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
growing – health risks in modern society (obesity, aerobic unfitness etc.
and loneliness) may be at least partly due to chronic stress responses!
We will explain below why this is possible.
6. Three ‘safety-compromised’ domains with chronic stress
responses
Taken together, the major hypothesis of GUTS is that pro-
longed physiological stress responses are caused by generalized
perceptions of unsafety (GU). This will be illustrated by three com-
promised domains that carry considerable somatic health risks. We
will now point out what we  mean with each compromised domain
and why we  hypothesize that the chronic physiological responses
associated with them are due to GU.
6.1. Compromised bodies: stress responses in low fit bodies
A large range of conditions that are, at first glance, not directly
related to stress, such as obesity, low aerobic fitness and old age
(Thayer et al., 2010; Zulfiqar et al., 2010) and many other ‘low
capacity’ bodily states (Thayer et al., 2010), are still associated
with chronic low HRV. Are people in these conditions chronically
‘stressed’? This is indeed what we  hypothesize. In terms of GUTS:
these people are not recognizing sufficient safety to inhibit the
default stress response. The generalization of safety (or unsafety)
is, partly, a function of our fitness, that is, our physical capabil-
ity to cope with stressors. This is for example clearly evident from
the common experience that when not ‘feeling well’ we  perceive
challenges to be much. A possibly less evident example is that it
has been consistently found that various forms of bodily unfitness
cause a overestimation of physical challenges: for example they
make a distance to a target seem greater and a hill seem steeper
(Proffitt, 2006). Bodily information, mediated by afferent visceral
neural pathways, sometimes referred to as “gut feelings” – although
they are largely unconscious – is an inseparable part of the organ-
ism’s emotional state (Damasio, 1991; Mayer, 2011). This includes
predicted safety. However, we  propose that the influence of ‘fitness’
goes way beyond merely ‘not feeling well’.
6.1.1. A kilo more of fat meant a less safe world
In earlier stages of our evolution, an obese body meant a seri-
ous reduction in fight/flight ability in the face of the ubiquitous
threats of ancestral life. For millions of year, even a single kilo of
excess fat meant a somewhat lower capacity to exert a fight or flight
response to e.g. predators, alien tribes, intra group violence, vari-
ous threats to one’s offspring etc. The same was  true for all other
conditions that compromise the body’s fitness, such as low aer-
obic fitness, older age, fatigue, illness and pain, even though e.g.
obese or older people can be relatively fit. The world was generally
less safe for people in these conditions, and it had survival value
not to inhibit the default stress response. Importantly, despite the
increased objective environmental safety, modern human bodies
still respond in a similar manner. Therefore, in all these conditions
the stress response is more ‘on edge’, as reflected in a low HRV
(Thayer et al., 2010; Zulfiqar et al., 2010). In neurobiological terms,
a compromised body does not provide sufficient bodily informa-
tion to allow the brain to predict complete safety (Smith et al.,
2015). With such a lack of information the system falls back upon
the default and therefore the default stress response is chronicallyents that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress
 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.019
active (i.e. not inhibited, as reflected in low HRV), and as is illus-
trated in Fig. 1f and in Fig. 2b (‘all contexts’). GUTS proposes that this
explains a considerable part of the autonomic imbalance and high
disease risk that accompanies these conditions. (cf., Julius, 1995).
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.1.2. GUTS: more parsimonious explanation
Although in each of these very different conditions (i.e. older
ge, obesity, etc.) there are biological pathways that may partially
xplain low HRV, GUTS is the first theory that explains the chronic
ow HRV that they share by an overarching principle – GU and the
efault stress response – which is much more scientifically parsi-
onious. Julius (1995) argued before that autonomic imbalance as
ndexed by chronic low HRV in overweight and related conditions
uch as diabetes was due to chronic ‘hypervigilance’ or ‘defense’
esponses. However, he did not generalize this to other ‘compro-
ised body’ conditions, and did not interpret those responses in
erms of default stress responses caused by GU. One might say
hat obese, aerobically or otherwise unfit, and older persons are
ctually enduring (largely unnoticed) chronic stress or anxiety
ecause in these bodily conditions no safety signal can be detected
ith respect to their physical ability to deal with stressors. Yet,
lthough we expect that in these conditions, high levels of GU will
e observed – which largely remains to be tested – it is likely that
ot all (older, unfit, obese) people will report chronic increased
evels of stress, perhaps because of the gradual onset and continu-
nce of their stress, and because their world only gradually became
ore uncertain in terms of safety. Better to phrase it in GUTS’ termi-
ology: they are deficient in inhibiting the default stress response
ecause of generalized unsafety (GU) – in the absence of any (even
ncertain) threats.
.2. Compromised social network: loneliness and perceived
nsafety
A second domain in which perceptions of unsafety may  become
eneralized, is that of the personal social network – or the lack
hereof. For social animals such as humans, the social safety sig-
als are the most important (cf. Coan’s Social Baseline Theory;
oan, 2010). Specifically, belonging to a cohesive and support-
ng social network or simply perceiving sufficient friendly people
round appears vital (Cacioppo et al., 2015) and is linked to an
ncreased HRV (Porges, 2007). However, increasingly more peo-
le in the modern world have weak or virtually non-existent social
etworks. Loneliness (perceived social isolation; Cacioppo et al.,
015) is rapidly growing in modern society presumably due to a
icious combination of ‘graying’ and individualization. Loneliness
redicts increased morbidity and mortality even after adjusting for
ealth behaviours (ibidem). A recent study suggested that social
solation rather than the perception of loneliness is responsible
or higher mortality (Steptoe et al., 2013). Evidence is growing
or chronic autonomic (including low HRV) and endocrine stress
esponses in lonely animals and humans which likely mediates
heir health risk (ibidem; Hawkley et al., 2003). A recent study
ven found a dose response relationship between lower social
ntegration and physiological dysregulation (Yang et al., 2016).
owever, although loneliness is associated with chronic stress
esponses, there is no particular stressor in loneliness that is respon-
ible for its health risks. The most important ill health causing
spect seems to be the continuous lack of something important,
amely social contact. In terms of GUTS, loneliness is a condition
n which the social network is compromised, that is, the primary
ource of safety is generally unavailable. We  argue that it is GU
hat is the cause of the chronic stress responses in loneliness,
nd not stressors, as illustrated in Fig. 1f and in Fig. 2b (‘all con-Please cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
exts’).
Interestingly, in another common condition in which the social
etwork is compromised, that is social anxiety, chronic low HRV
as been reported (e.g. Licht et al., 2009). PRESS
havioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 7
6.3. Compromised contexts: context-conditioned stress responses
without stressors
The generalization of safety (or unsafety) is not only a func-
tion of the capacity of the body and the availability of primary
safety (social network), but also of learning experiences. So, the
third personal domain in which GU and low HRV may occur is in
situations, or environments that are neutral (safe) by themselves,
but that have acquired a threat value by their association with a
stressor, through context conditioning (Grillon et al., 2006; Melzig
et al., 2009). For example, responses to the working environment
can become context-conditioned (Maren et al., 2013) because of
the potential presence of bullying colleagues, or responses to the
home environment in the case of marital discord. Again, the point
here is that neither stressors nor their cognitive representation (PC),
whether conscious or unconscious, are necessary for a chronic default
stress response to remain activated (i.e. not inhibited). As men-
tioned earlier, each normal life contains multiple stressors that are
unavoidable, and all of us, even those with superior coping skills
and generalized perceptions of control (e.g. having high optimism
or having an internal locus of control), have to face the fact that
there are always stressors on the horizon. To maintain good health
it is therefore important to restrict our stress responses as much as
possible to episodes in which stressors actually happen, and to brief
periods of ‘productive’ PC, i.e. problem solving. As a metaphor, one
can think of the antelope that never runs further away from the
lion (the ever present stressor) than necessary to allow for suffi-
cient time (the safe period) to easily escape from the next attack.
Obviously, many of us do not succeed in this, and cognitively per-
severate a lot in between stressors, consciously or unconsciously,
causing a lot more stress responses than are strictly necessary, as
illustrated in Fig. 1b. However, the novel insight proposed here
is that many people show far more stress responses in the long
stretches of time between stressors and also when they do not think
about these stressors, i.e. conscious or unconscious PC, as is illus-
trated in Fig. 1c and d. Thus, the stress-related contexts do not only
cause prolonged disinhibition of the default response by trigger-
ing (un)conscious stress-related thinking, but also, and much more
often, by failing to offer a perception of safety.
6.3.1. Failure to recognize contexts as safe
Fear (stress) responses can therefore be conditioned to the
wider environment, i.e. the context, in which a threatening stim-
ulus (stressor) occurred earlier. One example is work stress, of
which health risks and chronic stress responses have been well
documented. For example, scoring in the highest quartile of work
stress increases cardiovascular disease risk up to 3.6 times (Bosma
et al., 1998) in a dose response fashion (Chandola et al., 2008),
with follow-up times of between 4 and 12 years. GUTS’s hypothesis
is that people suffering from any type of work stress show pro-
longed low HRV in work related contexts without actual stressors
or PC, and that these low HRV responses are due to GU. For exam-
ple, in the case of the work stress type of bullying, which forms a
serious health risk (Nielsen et al., 2012; Verkuil et al., 2015), the
stress response, that is initially linked to the real situation of being
bullied, might get linked to contexts related to work (office, build-
ing, area, email at home, etc.) and even to non-stressor-related but
work-related thoughts. In this way  many stressor-free but stressor-
related contexts, in which we spend a large part of our daily life,
may  become – largely unconsciously – perceived as unsafe and lead
to a protracted disinhibition of the default stress response. Cru-
cially, this is also the case when we  do not have any (un)consciousents that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress
 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.019
stress-related thoughts (PC), either triggered or not by these con-
texts. In other words: stress-related cognition is no requirement for
a continued default stress response. The latter can in fact continue
until the stressor-free but stressor-related context is abandoned,
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hether that context is real or merely cognitive represented. There
re virtually endless realistic combinations of stressors leading to
U to their contexts and subsequent seriously protracted stress
esponses. For example, people suffering from the stressor of finan-
ial debt carry an increased risk for disease (Rosengren et al., 2004).
hey may  very frequently fail to shut down their default stress
esponse not so much because of the number of actual exposures
o their stressor or thoughts thereof, but far more by being faced
lmost continuously with a myriad of contexts that are associated
ith the stressor, that have become ‘unsafe’: e.g. shops, financial
ewspaper pages, signs of Euro’s (or other currencies), wallets,
anks. Another example is the teenager fearing social exclusion
ho has a disinhibited default stress response during the many
ours of handling a smart phone or computer – again without these
evices necessary triggering any conscious or unconscious PC. Or
he situation of caregiving for a spouse with Alzheimer, which is
ssociated with enhanced cardiovascular risk (Lee et al., 2003), how
any cues in one’s surroundings irrespective of the presence of the
pouse, or stress-laden thoughts of him/her, sustain GU and therefore
he disinhibition of the default stress response?
Clearly, there are many examples of how GU can develop in orig-
nally safe contexts. Obviously, this greatly expands the likelihood
or prolonged stress responses and related health risk. The different
ffects of relatively short stress due to stressors and PC and much
ore prolonged stress responses due to GU and their effects on
omatic disease are illustrated in Fig. 2b below.
An extreme example of the compromised domain of context is
eneralized anxiety disorder (GAD), sufferers of which do not only
orry in virtually every context, but because of their continuously
ow HRV (Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004; Thayer et al., 1996 seem to be
extremely contextually conditioned” (see Brosschot et al., 2016).
. Concluding remarks
The generalized unsafety theory of stress, GUTS, proposes an
ntirely new theoretical perspective on stress, based on evolution-
heoretic and neurobiological reasoning. The two core ideas are
hat: (1) the stress response is a default response that is nor-
ally under tonic inhibition; (2) when no safety is perceived, the
efault response remains uninhibited. Chronic stress is not due to
he presence of something (i.e. stressors, threat) but the lack of
omething else: safety. Chronic stress responses are due to gen-
ralized unsafety (GU). Only when safety is detected, there is PFC
nhibition of subcortical areas, especially the amygdala, which is
efelected by a high resting HRV. If not, regardless of presence of
ny stressor or its cognitive representation, PFC inhibition is with-
rawn, and the default stress response is unleashed, reflected in a
ow HRV. In healthy, well-adapted organisms, PFC inhibition is the
orm, which is consistent with the finding that neural inhibition is
on-costly and highly generalized. In contrast, PFC disinhibition of
he default stress response, is costly, and can cause chronic bodily
ysregulation and somatic disease.
We identified three domains of life in which GU can develop
nd which we call ‘compromised’: (1) ‘Compromised bodies’: e.g.
besity, low aerobic fitness and older age, in which GU is preserved
ue to its evolutionary survival value, i.e. to lower the threshold
or the stress response because of a reduced bodily capacity to deal
uccessfully with stressors (fight or flight); (2) ‘Compromised social
etwork’, e.g. loneliness, in which the primary source of safety, i.e.
eing part of a cohesive social network, is lacking; and (3) ‘Com-
romised contexts’, e.g. chronic stress, in which daily contexts thatPlease cite this article in press as: Brosschot, J.F., et al., Exposed to ev
response, and prolonged autonomic activity. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
re neutral by themselves may  become unsafe via context condi-
ioning. The great health risks of two of these (1 and 2) extremely
ommon conditions have not hitherto been explained in terms of
hronic stress. PRESS
havioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
The most important, and testable, implication of GUTS is this:
rather than elucidating the signals of stressors or threat, GUTS
implies that we should focus on identifying the key signals of
safety. Whereas others have proposed seemingly similar ideas to
the GUTS model there are some important differences. For exam-
ple, Maier and colleagues (Amat et al., 2005; Maier et al., 2006;
Maier, 2015) have noted that whereas most theories suggest that
uncontrollability activates the stress response, they suggest that
it is perceived control that actively inhibits the impact of stress-
ors. Similarly, Porges (2004) in the context of social engagement
proposed the concept of “neuroception” in which the nervous sys-
tem continuously and mostly unconsciously evaluates risk. Both of
these ideas are similar to GUTS with one major difference: they
each rely on actual stressors or perceptions of risk whereas GUTS
emphasizes that the stress response is the default response that is
only “turned off” when safety is clearly perceived. Crucially, these
safety signals are not by definition the counterparts of the signals
of threat: for living organisms the absence of threat does not equal
the presence of safety.
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